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Abstract—To counter the growing threat of malicious subver-
sions to the design of a microprocessor, there is a great need for
simple, automated methods for detecting such malevolent changes.
Based on the adoption of the Property Specification Language
(PSL) for behavioral verification, and the advent of tools for
automatically generating synthesizable hardware design language
(HDL) constructs for verifying a PSL assertion, we propose a new
method called Security Checkers, which uses security-focused PSL
assertions to create hardware design units for detecting malicious
inclusions at runtime.
We describe the process flow for creating Security Checkers and
demonstrate by example how they can be used to detect malicious
inclusions in a processor design. Because the checkers can be
used in simulation, FPGA emulation, or as part of a fabricated
design, we illustrate how this technique can be used to detect
malicious inclusions over a much broader segment of the processor
development lifecycle, compared to existing methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
General purpose processors are used widely in high-
assurance applications, such as in classified networks, sophis-
ticated military hardware, and critical infrastructure. Though
most general-purpose processors are designed in the U.S.,
some even in certified trusted design facilities, vulnerabilities
to microprocessor design exist at many stages of the acquisition
chain.
In general, introducing a malicious inclusion (MI)1 into a
real processor is difficult, tending to require the resources of a
large, well-supported organization, whereas malicious software
can be generated easily. However, a physical subversion may
be a serious threat, since it can bypass all software defenses
and give an attacker complete control over the target system.
A. Description of the Threat
A typical general-purpose processor may be designed in the
U.S., fabricated in Taiwan or China, shipped to another country
for assembly onto a printed circuit board, then installed in a
finished product at yet another location. Malicious changes to
a processor can be introduced during any of these phases.
B. Fake Chips in the Supply Chain
Once subverted, a processor could easily find its way into
a high-assurance application, given the difficulty of securing
1Often called “Hardware Trojans,” we refer to subversions in hardware
instead as “malicious inclusions,” in order to preserve a semantic distinction
from the Trojan Horse, which requires some action of naive acceptance by the
object of the attack, like opening a malicious attachment or hyperlink.
the enormous and complex processor supply chain. Most often,
lower-quality fake processors with comparable functionality are
re-labeled and sold in place of higher-priced originals. Quoting
a recent newspaper report: [21]
• From November 2007 through May 2010, U.S. Customs
officials said they seized 5.6 million counterfeit chips.
• Two men indicted in October, 2010 admitted importing
from China more than 13,000 fake chips altered to re-
semble those from legitimate companies, including Intel,
Atmel, Altera and National Semiconductor. Among those
buying the chips was the U.S. Navy.
The motivation for these fakes is apparently economic, and
the replacement processors usually perform the intended func-
tion (albeit with poorer performance), but they underscore
the possibility that maliciously modified processors could be
surreptitiously introduced into the supply chain and end up in
targeted high-assurance applications.
C. Examples of Malicious Inclusions
Though real-world occurrences of MIs may be kept from
the public, some reports do occasionally surface. For example,
according to a New York Times article [23], during a 2008
Israeli raid on a suspected Syrian nuclear facility, the Syrian
air defenses may have been disabled by a “kill switch” that
had been surreptitiously introduced.
More recently, researchers disclosed the existence of a hid-
den hardware-coded password that provides access to undocu-
mented machine status registers in some AMD processors [6],
[5], though it’s not yet clear what level of control can be gained
by accessing these registers.
Researchers have explored various avenues for creating pro-
cessor MIs, as well. Jin, Kupp, and Makris showed several
methods for extracting a secret key from an encryption pro-
cessor [20]. King et al. designed modifications that allow an
adversary to conduct “escalation of privilege” and “shadow
mode” attacks on a processor [22].
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Existing methods for detecting malicious changes to a pro-
cessor’s design generally fall into two categories: physical
analysis and design analysis.
A. Physical Analysis
Physical analysis of a processor is either destructive or
nondestructive. Wang, Tehranipoor, and Plusquellic described
the various physical analysis methods [28], summarized below.
1) Destructive Techniques: To facilitate physical analysis,
a processor must undergo backside thinning. Once the active
layers are exposed, sophisticated imaging equipment is used
to map the processor’s physical layout, which can then be
compared against a reference specification.
The obvious limitation of invasive imaging methods is the
impracticality of using it on any more than a small repre-
sentative sample of chips. Also, the resolution of even the
most expensive and advanced imaging technology lags slightly
behind state-of-the-art processor feature sizes [8].
2) Nondestructive Techniques: Some malicious inclusions
can be detected without destroying the processor under inspec-
tion. These methods involve stimulating the processor’s inputs
with digital or analog test patterns, and observing the outputs.
The electrical and timing output characteristics form a kind of
“fingerprint” for that processor, which can be compared against
the fingerprint of a “golden” reference chip for the presence of
observable deviations [19], [25].
These methods can be useful for detecting larger malicious
inclusions, but may not detect changes affecting less than
around .01%2 of a processor’s circuitry [11], and they also rely
on the existence of the “golden” reference chip for comparison.
B. Design Analysis
1) Applying Information Flow Controls: Algorithms have
been proposed [27] for constraining a hardware design in
order to prevent information flow between entities, when one
device must process data at multiple levels of confidentiality or
integrity. Though not specifically engineered around malicious
inclusions, information-flow control techniques can be used
to eliminate channels between multi-level data or processes,
regardless of whether the channels were maliciously introduced
or were inadvertent design artifacts. However, gate-level infor-
mation flow engineering does not eliminate MIs that employ
non-information-flow attacks, such as the previously mentioned
examples from King et al. [22].
2) Detecting Design Subversions: Because processor de-
signs are large and complex, are the product of many contribut-
ing engineers, and often use third-party intellectual property,
malicious inclusions can be introduced into a high-level design
while it is being developed. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency is sponsoring research in improving our ability
to deduce the trustworthiness of a processor design [1].
One method for divining the existence of MIs in an HDL
design was proposed by Hicks, et al. [17]. During the design
verification phase, they identify sections of the design code
that are not triggered by the verification tests. They bypass the
“suspicious” circuits with a trigger to an exception-handling
routine, using software emulation instead. The method, called
Blue Chip, can detect malicious changes to a design and
obviates them with a small overhead; however, it requires
dedicated support from the operating system (it is a combined
2Optimization techniques that an adversary can use to keep an attack
relatively small, even below this threshold, were illustrated by Jin, Kupp, and
Makris [20].
hardware-software approach), relies on a test suite to flag the
suspicious circuits, and does not detect malicious modifications
made after the HDL design phase, such as changes to the
synthesized netlists.
In the next section, we propose a new design analysis
method, called Security Checkers, for detecting the presence
of MIs in a processor design, across a broader cross-section of
a processor’s lifecycle.
III. SECURITY CHECKER METHODOLOGY
A. Introduction
Security Checkers are an application of recently developed
techniques for automatically generating synthesizable hardware
entities that verify temporal logic properties. Specifically, a
property in a temporal logic language like the Property Spec-
ification Language can be verified at runtime using HDL con-
structs that are automatically generated by specially designed
tools, as described later.
The principal idea behind the Security Checker method is
to adapt these recently-developed verification tools to facilitate
the creation of security-relevant runtime checkers which are
capable of detecting the action of MIs. Functional verification
and MI detection in a processor are related, but complementary
- functional verification establishes that the processor correctly
executes the specified functionality (arithmetic, jumps, I/O
interrupts, etc.), whereas MI detection looks for two things:
• The presence of additional functionality that is not speci-
fied in the architectural specification, and
• The modification of existing functionality that may cause
it to deviate from that permitted by the security-relevant
features of the architectural specification, such as privilege
levels, memory segment controls, or special registers.
It is worth emphasizing here that the architectural specification,
not the processor design, is the baseline for what is and is not
“malicious” behavior in a processor. In general, an architectural
specification will define the components and instruction set and
how they are to behave, but leave the details to the designers. As
a result, an x86 chip from Intel and an x86 chip from AMD, for
example, may be functionally equivalent but potentially quite
different “under the hood.”
B. Formal Methods, Model Checking, and Runtime Verification
Processor evaluation generally falls into three categories -
formal methods, model checking, and runtime verification.
Formal Methods verification involves proving logically spec-
ified properties using tools like Isabelle [2]. Not all interesting
properties of a system are statically decidable, however, and
complex proofs can be tedious.
Model Checking employs several methods for verifying the
correctness of a design. For processor verification, SystemVer-
ilog and the Open Verification Methodology (OVM) have
gained in popularity [18]. Because they rely to a great extent
on random generation of test stimuli, however, such methods
are well suited for verification (since they are likely to uncover
a logical flaw), but not well suited for detecting MIs that may
be triggered by a rare event. For example, an MI triggered only
by a specific 64-bit value appearing in an opcode or on a data
bus might require generating 264 test stimuli to be certain it is
activated and detected.
In the context of triggering and detecting MIs, Runtime
Verification may also suffer from the need to trigger a stim-
ulus event that is very rare, but it does have one advantage
over the other methods - it can be performed even when a
system is in fielded operation, giving it the ability to detect
malicious changes made after the high-level design phase.
Formal methods and model checking of a high-level design will
not detect malicious changes made subsequently, such as to a
processor’s synthesized netlist, mask files, or physical structure.
On the other hand, runtime checkers can be synthesized into
a processor design, allowing them to detect subversions added
after the high-level design phase, assuming the checker itself
is not also subverted.
C. PSL Background
Because we plan to use a portion of PSL to characterize what
constitutes malicious behavior, a brief description is in order.
PSL was adopted as an IEEE standard [7] in 2005, based on
work done by Accellera and IBM. It is described in the specifi-
cation as “a standard language for specifying electronic system
behavior.” PSL is organized into four “layers” - the boolean,
temporal, verification, and modeling layers, each building upon
the other; the boolean and temporal layers are of primary
interest here.
The boolean layer allows the construction of propositional
logic expressions; the propositional variables model circuits’
binary 0/1 values in a design. The temporal layer is used
to describe complex temporal relations between those signals,
evaluated over several clock cycles. The formulas in the tem-
poral layer are called sequential expressions; together with
boolean expressions, they are built up into properties. Each
property is a description of how some portion of the system
should behave. Properties may then be asserted, or required to
hold, during verification.
We focus on PSL’s Foundation Language (FL), which derives
from linear temporal logic, or LTL3. In a linear-time logic,
observable events are ordered in time, and sequences of events
do not branch. Eisner gives justification [14] for focusing on
linear-time logic, to the exclusion of branching logic, in runtime
verification:
The complexity of branching time model check-
ing is better than that of linear time model check-
ing. . . [but] only linear time makes sense for dynamic
runtime verification. . . The overlap between linear and
branching time is a large one, and the vast majority
of properties used in practice belong to the overlap.
3In PSL, the LTL operators G, F, W, U, X, and X! are replaced by their
descriptive equivalents always (never), eventually!, until, until!, next, and next!,
where ! indicates the strong form of an operator, rather than the weak form.
Fortunately, as noted in the IEEE PSL standard [7], any spec-
ification in the FL can be compiled down to an LTL formula4,
which will be useful in Section III-E.
D. Security Assertions
We define a security assertion as an asserted PSL FL property
that contains one or more security-relevant invariants which
map from the architectural specification to the processor design.
The process is outlined in the following steps:
• Identify security-relevant features of the specification, such
as privilege levels, protected registers, etc.
• From the processor design, identify the circuits which
perform these security-relevant functions.
• In terms of the identified circuits, create PSL assertions
that define security compliance, as described in the archi-
tectural specification.
• Using the available automated tools, translate the security
assertions into synthesizable HDL code.
• Attach the created HDL entities (Security Checkers) to the
design, and use them to complement functional verifica-
tion, typically in simulation or FPGA emulation.
• If desired, leave the Security Checkers in the design,
and fabricate them along with the processor, to facilitate
detection of MIs in real time.
The following are a few examples of security invariants that
might be mapped from an architectural specification to a
processor design using security assertions:
• Only a process running in privileged mode may modify
the control/special registers.
• Execution transfers from user mode to kernel mode must
only occur through specifically defined processor gates,
interrupt calls, or exceptions.
• A memory segment labeled with a certain privilege level
may not be modified or read by a process labeled with a
lower privilege level.
Though it appears in these examples that we are duplicating the
processor’s own protection logic, in fact the Security Checker
derives its form primarily from the specification, not from the
processor design; only the named circuits involved, which are
passively observed by the Checker, come from the processor
design. How exactly the security requirement is implemented
internal to the processor design is transparent to the Checker;
it merely verifies that the implementation executes in a manner
faithful to the specification, as described by the assertion.
E. Synthesis of Runtime Security Checkers
The idea of runtime checkers for acceptance of properties
specified in LTL and PSL builds on work by Pnueli, who
described the construction of “Testers” [24] for dynamic ver-
ification. The idea of using fabricated finite state machines
as checkers specifically for processor security was mentioned
conceptually by Abramovici and Bradley [10], but they left
open the details of the FSM construction.
4With the possible addition of some auxiliary HDL code, referred to as a
satellite.
1) FL to LTL to Buchi Automata: The ability to translate
FL properties into LTL, noted earlier, is important because it
allows us to leverage a body of previous work on the efficient
translation of LTL to Buchi Automata [16]. As observed by
Pnueli, Gastin, and others, the resulting Buchi Automata can be
used for runtime checking of whether the original LTL formula
holds over a given sequence.
2) FOCs, MBAC, SynPSL: Before PSL was formalized,
Abarbanel, et al., developed a system called Formal Checkers
(FoCs) for converting some logic formulas into equivalent,
simulatable VHDL [9]. Boule and Zilic improved on FoCs
in both efficiency and breadth [13]. Another conversion tool,
SynPSL, was developed by Findenig for a subset of the FL [15].
Pnueli, Boule, and Findenig all use a form of Buchi Automata
(BA) as an intermediate format to translate logic formulas into
equivalent synthesizable HDL entities5 [15], [13], [24]. See
Figure 1 for a diagram of the workflow for creating Security
Checkers, using one of the aforementioned tools.
Figure 1. Workflow for the Security Checkers methodology.
IV. DEMONSTRATION
A. Processor Design
For this demonstration, we chose the Plasma CPU, by
Rhoads, from OpenCores.org [4]. The Plasma is a system-on-
chip processor design that implements most of the instructions
in the 32-bit MIPS-1 architecture [3]. It has a pipelined execu-
tion unit, 32 registers, and a single cache, and provides support
for hardware and software interrupts. It has components for
serial port communication and Ethernet. We implemented the
Plasma on a Spartan-3a FPGA.
B. Example Malicious Inclusion
Since it is a simple processor, designed for experimentation
and smaller applications, the Plasma does not implement some
of the more sophisticated MIPS functionality, such as kernel and
user modes, and protected virtual memory [3]. Therefore, the
MI we designed was relatively subtle - we implemented a trig-
gered opcode stealer - when active, it replaces the functionality
of an unused, deprecated MIPS opcode. The “stolen” opcode,
BEQL, is branch if equal, likely, 6 which is not implemented
5Note that modern hardware-design tools are able to accept some PSL
specifications and test them in simulation, but these are simulator-specific
features, whereas the checkers generated using the tools mentioned above
generate synthesizable HDL entities - actual design units that can not only be
simulated in any design software, but also emulated in FPGAs and fabricated
into silicon.
6“Likely” instructions were meant to aid in prediction performance, by
denoting an operation such as a conditional branch as being more likely to
be taken than not.
in the normal Plasma design. Until the MI is triggered, the
BEQL instruction is ignored, as in a NOP. Once triggered, the
BEQL instruction instead mimics the functionality of a store
word (SW) instruction, allowing the adversary to covertly write
data to an arbitrary location in memory. By stealing the opcode
in this way, any of the normal memory protection mechanisms
implemented via the legitimate memory-access functions are
bypassed.
The on and off triggers of our MI would not be found
in “normal” machine code; they are intentionally designed as
machine instructions no sensible compiler would ever create.
The on-trigger is the instruction ORI r0, r0, 0, which takes the
contents of register zero (which is hardwired to zero), executes
a logical OR with the immediate value 0, and places the
result back in r0 (an action which would be ignored anyway).
Since it accomplishes no useful work, a compiler would not
generate this instruction. Any random 32-bit value could be
used as the immediate operand, of course, rather than just 0.
As demonstrated by King and Hicks [22], [17], the trigger can
be a series of two or more machine-code instructions, making
it even more difficult to detect through normal verification
methods. Similarly, the off-trigger we use is XORI r0, r0, 0.
The BEQL opcode is only “stolen,” executing a surreptitious
memory operation, if it happens between an on-trigger and an
off-trigger.
C. Example Security Checker and Detection
In the Plasma MIPS architecture, the only instructions al-
lowed to write to memory have opcodes between 39 and 44 (the
opcode of BEQL is 20). Therefore, the PSL assertion we used
to verify that only the proper opcodes can affect the circuits in
charge of commanding a write out to memory is:
assert never [((mem_source(0)=’1’) and not
((opcode>39) and (opcode<44))] @rose(clk)
where rose indicates a clock rising edge, and
mem_source(0)=’1’ is a condition for propagating a memory
write command. This example assertion is a simple boolean
expression, but PSL also allows for properties that are
sequences of expressions over time, repeated sequences,
concatenated sequences, and triggers from one sequence to
the another, for example, allowing the construction of rich
and complex properties. [7]. Though a processor design may
require a significant number of security assertions, especially
for a large processor, for brevity we discuss here only the
assertion required for detecting MIs of the type in the example.
We synthesized the security assertion using SynPSL [15],
which automatically constructed a small, complete VHDL
entity called checker1.vhd, which we then pasted into the
Plasma design. When we ran simulations of arbitrary code
execution, the MI remained dormant, and the Security Checker
did not detect a fault.
We then ran simulations of the Plasma running executable
code that contained the software triggers for the MI. The
malicious logic was activated and performed its backdoor write
to memory. The assembly code segment for the demonstration
is shown in Figure 2:
ORI $0, $0, 0 ; on-trigger for MI
BEQL $8, $9, 0 ; surreptitious memory access
XORI $0, $0, 0 ; off-trigger for MI
BEQL $8, $9, 0 ; MI is dormant, instr. ignored
Figure 2. Assembly Code for MI Trigger and Test. The
MI is only active between an on-trigger and an off-trigger.
In the simulation image in Figure 3, the signal checker1_fail
goes high at around 9,000ns, at the time the MI is active in the
second instruction in Figure 2, but does not go high afterward,
since the MI has been disabled by the off-trigger. The failure
detection occurs with one clock cycle of latency.
Figure 3. ModelSim demonstration of MI detection. Note
checker1_fail, in the third row, goes high at around 9,000ns.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Since we designed both the security assertions and the MI
in this case, the detection was straightforward. We hope to test
a suite of Security Checkers against unknown MIs, produced
independently, in other experiments. When synthesized for a
Spartan-3a FPGA, the state machine for checker1 had no effect
on maximum clock rate, and added approximately .1% of area
overhead, in terms of configurable logic blocks, or “slices.” We
note the following strengths and limitations of the methodology.
Strengths:
• It is the first technique for detecting MIs that is not some
form of “equivalence checking” between two designs,
since it derives the notion of security compliance directly
from a processor’s architectural specification.
• Construction of the HDL code for the checkers is auto-
mated, thanks to the conversion tools.
• Synthesizable HDL entities can easily be run on all
existing simulators.
• The checkers can be added to, and removed from, a target
processor’s design without affecting its operation.
• It works across simulation, emulation, and fabrication, and
detects changes made after the high-level design. The same
generated constructs can be used throughout.
• Once the checkers are in place, the target design can be
obfuscated without impeding the checkers’ operation.
• It can be used to detect MIs which are very small in size,
and so not detectable by physical analysis techniques.
Limitations:
• To detect MIs that employ rare-event triggers, there must
be some way to discover the trigger. We are interested in
integrating HDL “code coverage” tools to assist with this
difficult task in simulation checks. On the other hand, if
the checkers are left in the processor, rare-event triggered
MIs can be captured as they occur, at runtime.
• Some architectural specifications may not contain suffi-
cient details of all permitted and proscribed behaviors.
• Though the conversion tool is automated, the construction
of the original PSL security assertions must be done
manually, and requires some knowledge of the design.
• The fabricated checkers add power and area overhead. We
seek to quantify these requirements in future work.
• Even low-latency detection may not preclude “zero-cycle”
attacks, such as an immediate disablement.
• The checkers can be bypassed by an attacker with detailed
knowledge of how the monitoring is being performed, if
the adversary gains access after the checkers are installed.
• In the general case, properties that are not safety properties
(e.g., liveness or fairness properties) may not be Security-
Checker enforceable, since a Security Checker is a form
of Execution Monitor [26].
A. Comparison to Other Methods
When comparing methods of MI detection across the design
lifecycle, there are three important phases to consider. The first
is the baseline reference stage of the design that is assumed to
be secure (not subverted). The second is the design phase during
which the detection method is employed, or the application
stage. The third, the detection window, is the portion of the
design lifecycle during which malicious modifications (if made
in that portion) will be eventually detected - the larger the
detection window, the better, for detecting MIs.
For example, physical analysis methods [11], [25] take the
“golden sample” chip as a baseline; if both chips come from
one design process and the design was corrupted, though, both
the reference chip and test chip may match, since both could
derive from the same modified design.
The Blue Chip method [17], described earlier, assumes that
the design may have been subverted, but trusts that the verifica-
tion suite will correctly highlight any “suspicious” circuits; the
authors note that an incomplete or subverted verification suite
would undermine the method. Also, malicious changes made
after the high-level design phase (such as changes to the netlist
or chip mask) may not be detected.
Another interesting design analysis approach called Trusted
RTL was presented by Banga and Hsiao [12]. They compared
a trusted behavioral model and an untrusted RTL design, using
input test patterns to find suspicious circuits that are rarely
triggered, then localizing down to specific differences. Since the
approach relies on a SAT-solver, the scalability of an apparently
NP-hard detection problem seems an open question. Also,
their equivalence-checking method only detects deviations in-
troduced between a high-level behavioral description and an
optimized register-transfer level (RTL) description, covering a
relatively narrow detection window and requiring a trusted high-
level design.
The Security Checkers approach, though it also references
the high-level design, reaches all the way back to the original
architectural specification to help define what is security com-
pliant vs. what is malicious. Since this approach allows the
Checkers to be carried forward through simulation, emulation,
and fabrication, it can detect MIs over a broad segment of the
design lifecycle. The baseline reference, application stage, and
detection window for each approach discussed are shown in
Figure 4.
Figure 4. Baseline reference, application stage, and
vulnerability window for various MI detection methods.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
We hope to scale up the demonstration to do a full suite
of assertions on a more complex processor, and investigate
the algorithmic complexity, specifically as it impacts area and
power overhead added by the checkers. As the method matures,
it may be useful for design tool manufacturers to incorporate a
robust set of checker-generators for PSL.
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